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Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and  
Traditional Measures of Market Power 
 
Abstract 
This study asks the question, what is the relationship between traditional models of 
market power and structural auction models?  An encompassing model is derived that 
considers both price markdowns due to bid shading during an auction and price 
markdowns at the industry-level due to imperfect competition.  Data from a cattle 
procurement experimental market is used to compare the appropriateness of the two 
alternative theories.  Regression results show that while the number of firms is more 
important than the number of bidders on lot of cattle in explaining pricing behavior in the 
game, the number of bidders does contain some unique information and should be 
included in the model.  Both the traditional NEIO and structural auction approaches 
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Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and  
Traditional Measures of Market Power 
 
Potential anti-competitive behavior of beef packers in cattle procurement markets has 
been well documented in recent years (Ward, 2002).  Cattle producers contend that they 
receive lower prices for their cattle because packers act strategically to depress prices 
below price levels in competitive markets.  For past decades,  the national four firm 
concentration ratio has increased significantly from 25% in 1976 to about 80% in 1998 
(Ward, 2002), which increases concern about possible packer market power in cattle 
procurement markets.  
Most recent empirical studies of competition in cattle markets have used the new 
empirical industrial organization (NEIO) model (Schroeter, 1988; Azzam, 1997; Koontz 
and Garcia, 1997; Sexton, 2000; Paul, 2001; Lopez et al., 2002).  The NEIO model seeks 
to explain market power originating from industry-level imperfect competition.  A few 
empirical studies have looked at disaggregate measures of concentration such as the 
number of bidders at an auction (Meyer, 1988; Bailey, Ward, 1992; Brorsen, and Fawson, 
1993; Bourgeon and Le Roux, 1996, 2001).  These latter studies of market power use 
concepts from auction theory (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Laffont and Vuong, 1996, 
Klemperer, 1999).  The auction models seek to explain market power due to bid shading 
at local markets, such as cattle auctions (Bailey, Brorsen, and Fawson, 1993), rice 
auctions (Meyer, 1988), or grain auctions (Bourgeon and Le Roux, 1996; Banerji and 
Meenakshi, 2004 ).  Auction models are agent-based models that enable estimation of 
market power considering the number of buyers, and sellers, and the bidding process at 
individual auctions.     4 
Although the empirical literature has mostly used the NEIO model, the auction 
model seems more closely tied to the way cattle markets work since cattle buyers make a 
large number of individual purchase decisions rather than setting an equilibrium price. 
While NEIO models depend on the number of sellers and buyers in the industry, and use 
equilibrium prices determined by industry level demand and supply, auction models 
involve buyers and sellers arriving at a transaction price for a given quantity and quality 
of cattle at a given place and time.  Thus, auction theory is associated with price 
discovery (i.e. focusing on microstructure), and the NEIO model is associated with price 
determination (i.e. focusing on macrostructure).  These concepts are interrelated, but are 
not the same (Ward and Schroeder, 2001).  Yet, previous studies seek to consider one 
market power effect or the other, not both.  Which of these two models estimate market 
power more accurately?  Should market power effects be added or do they measure the 
same thing?  Answers to these questions require a model considering both auction 
theory’s bid shading and industry-level imperfect competition.  To our best knowledge, 
such a model has not been developed in the literature. 
Therefore, this paper proposes an encompassing model that nests within it both 
auction theory’s bid shading and NEIO’s market-level imperfect competition.  We derive 
an encompassing model by extending the traditional NEIO to formally include 
markdowns from both bid shading and market-level imperfect competition.  The 
encompassing model derived in this paper is tested indirectly using data from an 
experimental cattle market.  Results show that even though the number of firms in the 
experimental game is more important than the number of bidders on a lot of cattle, an 
encompassing model is preferred to either NEIO or auction model.  Both NEIO   5 
overestimated the true price markdown possibly due to failure to account for the winners 
curse.  
Market Power in Cattle Procurement Markets 
 
The NEIO model and the auction model represent two major theories of possible market 
power in cattle procurement markets  The NEIO theory, pioneered by Appelbaum (1982), 
posits that market power effects can be measured via “conduct parameters” estimated 
from a set of behavioral equations describing firm’s production and pricing decisions 
(Bresnahan, 1989).  The intuition behind the NEIO theory is that oligopsony power is 
inversely related to the number of firms in the (aggregate) industry, and depends on the 
conjectures adopted by the firms in the industry.  Moreover, the theory posits that at any 
point in time firms make decisions using “equilibrium prices” determined by aggregate 
demand and supply.   
Recent studies using the NEIO model to study competition in the U.S. cattle 
markets include Schroeter (1988), Azzam and Schroeter (1995), Koontz and Garcia 
(1997), Paul (2001), and Lopez, Azzam and Espana (2002).  Most of these studies find 
little market power in cattle markets (Sexton, 2000; Ward, 2002).  However, since the 
NEIO model seeks to measure market power due to industry-level imperfect competition, 
price markups due to bid shading are not explicitly considered.  
The auction theory offers an alternative model about possible oligopsony power 
due to bid shading in auctions.  Auctions are market institutions with an explicit set of 
rules that are used to elicit information, in the form of bids, from potential buyer 
regarding their willingness to pay for the good being auctioned (Krishna, 2002).  Bidder’s   6 
willingness to pay is a function of all available information to the bidder and the type of 
auction. 
Auctions are widely used to sell agricultural commodities in local markets, and as 
such, they are important for the micro-level price discovery in agricultural markets.  
Prominent examples of agricultural commodities sold trough auctions in the U.S. are 
cattle (Crespi and Sexton, 2004), timber (Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard, 1997), and rice 
(Meyer, 1988).  Moreover, auctions have also been used to allocate contracts for school 
milk in the U.S. (Porter and Zona, 1999), to sell flowers in the Netherlands (Klemperer, 
1999), and to allocate wheat export contracts in Europe (Bourgeon and Le Roux, 1996, 
2001).  But, while a huge array of data are generated through auctions, few studies in the 
agricultural economics literature have used auction theory when examining competition 
in the U.S. food agricultural sector.  
Bidders acting strategically may exert oligopsony power by shading their bids 
below their valuation, thereby depressing prices below price levels in competitive 
markets.  However, there are several reasons why packers may bid less than their 
valuation other than active or passive collusion (Crespi and Sexton, 2004).  Bidders may 
shade their bids to earn a positive margin, especially in procuring intermediate 
agricultural inputs or commodities for resale.  Bidders may also shade their bids to avoid 
the winner’s curse in auctions with common valuations.  Conventions such as whole 
dollar bidding, reported in some cattle markets (Crespi and Sexton, 2004) and the 
NASDAQ (Christie and Schultz, 1994) may also lead to bid shading.   
Bailey, Brorsen, and Fawson (1993) were among the first to use auction data to 
estimate market power in cattle markets.  They used a single-equation (hedonic)   7 
regression of bids on lot characteristics and measures of concentration at local cattle 
auctions.  Bailey, Brorsen, and Fawson (1993) found an increase in concentration at local 
auctions depressed cattle prices, but the effect was small.  Crespi and Sexton (2004) also 
estimated a price-dependent hedonic regression to compare the buying pattern in the data 
with that predicted by their model.  Using simulations, they found that the estimated 
model predicted a different buying and selling pattern from original the data.  
This paper contributes to the literature in two areas.  First, we consider an 
encompassing model that considers price markdowns due to auction’s bid shading, and 
price distortions due to firm-level imperfect competition.  Second, we provide fresh 
empirical results to the literature about market power estimation.  
        a                
This section outlines the structural auction model that has been used to estimate possible 
market power in cattle markets.  Auction concepts were first proposed for empirical 
studies of price determination by Paarsch (1992), and extended by Guerre et al. (2000).  
Guerre et al. developed an equilibrium bidding model assuming first-price sealed-bid 
auctions with independent private values.  We make a similar set of assumptions and 
justify them in the context of our experimental auction market.  
The assumption of first-price sealed-bid auction implies that each bidder submits 
bids independently, and the bidder with the highest bid wins the auction and pays the 
amount of his bid.  The first-price aspect emerges because the winner of good for sale is 
the packer with the highest bid.  Our experimental cattle market is not a sealed-bid 
experiment but resembles it since bidders approach feedlots individually without 
knowing opponents’ bid.  Obviously, there are few instances where bidders can learn   8 
about rival’s bids.  Crespi and Sexton (2004) also assumed first-price sealed-bid auction 
assumption when studying packers’ bidding behavior in the Texas Panhandle.   
  Our model also assumes that packers have independent private values (IPV).  The 
IPV assumption implies that (a) bidder’s valuation is unique and privately known to the 
bidder, and (b) the valuations are drawn independently from a common distribution 
known to all packers.  While the more general case of affiliated or correlated values (i.e. 
bidder’s valuation has both private and common values) would be more adequate for our 
experimental cattle market, the IPV assumption is not inconsistent with the factors 
influencing bidders valuations in cattle markets, including our experimental cattle market.  
To see why, define each packer’s valuation for a lot of cattle as the difference between 
the price beef and the price of cattle.  Then, to the extent processing costs are unique to 
each packer and known only to the packer, there is an IPV component to the valuation 
(Banerji and Meenakshi, 2004).  Furthermore, as long as bidders have the same 
information about the common aspects and place similar weight on it, then the IPV 
assumption is not very restrictive (McAfee and McMillan, 1992).  A further reason to 
assume IPV is the simplicity it lends to our model.   
  We also assume repeated auctions rater than simultaneous auctions.  This 
assumption fits well our experimental cattle market and helps simplify the model.  This is 
because some real world cattle markets are characterized by repeated interaction of 
buyers.  The cattle market in the Texas Panhandle is an example of a local market where 
few buyers (three packers) interact repeatedly in procuring cattle via first price sealed-bid 
auctions (Crespi and Sexton, 2004).     9 
To illustrate the auction model considered in this study, consider a cattle market 
with few packers purchasing cattle through a sequence of first-price sealed-bid auctions 
in the context of IPV.  Packers’ valuation (   ) is defined as the price of processed beef 
) (
 
     minus the marginal cost  ) (       of processing cattle into beef.  That is  .   
 
           − =   
Although competing packers do not know opponents’ valuation, they know that all 
valuations  , including their own, come from a common distribution   ( ) which is 
continuous with density  (•). 
  As discussed previously, packer’s valuation depends on the processing technology 
employed.  Following Sexton (2000), we assume that beef packers use cattle and non-
farm processing inputs to produce beef,   
 , using a quasi-fixed proportion processing 
technology.  Such technology allows no substitution between cattle,   
 , and a vector of 
non-farm inputs, v, but may allow substitution between non-farm inputs.  Processors’ 
technology is represented as: 
)}, ( , / min{ v      
    γ =  
where 
        / ≤ γ  is the conversion factor between cattle and processed product.  Packer’s 
profit maximization requires that  ). ( / v      
    = = γ  
  In maximizing expected profits, π , the  th risk-neutral packer faces the following 
maximization problem (Bajari and Hortaçsu, 2005): 
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where   (  = 1,…,  ) is a subscript for packer, and   (  = 1,…,  ) is a subscript representing 
the  th cattle lot,     =    
 
      −  is packer  ’s per-unit valuation of processed product    , 
produced at processing cost    , and sold at price ;
 
     
 
     is packer  ’s dollar bid for cattle, 
(2.2) 
(2.1)   10 
) (
 
     ϕ  is the inverse of the equilibrium bid function, 
1 )) ( (
−      
       ϕ  is the probability 
that packer   wins the auction of the  th lot of cattle, and    is the number of packers 
bidding for the  th lot of cattle. 
The first-order condition for maximizing packer’s profits is: 
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which can be re-arranged and rewritten as: 
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distribution functions evaluated at  .
 
        
  Equation (2.4) shows that packer’s strategic behavior could yield bids below 
packer’s valuation    .  The markdown or bid-shading factor is represented by the second 
member of the right hand side of equation (2.4) (Hortaçsu, 2002).  Notice that the bid-
shading factor is inversely related to the number of bidders    bidding for the  th lot of 
cattle rather than the number of firms in the industry.  The bid-shading factor approaches 
zero as the number of bidders for lot   approaches infinity.   
                
 
This section outlines the NEIO model about possible market power in cattle procurement 
markets.  This theory was proposed by Appelbaum (1982) and Bresnahan (1989).  Unlike 
(2.3) 
(2.4)   11 
the auction model, NEIO measure of market power depends on the number of firms in the 
industry rather than the number of bidders for a particular lot of cattle.  In addition, 
packers are assumed to make their decision based on “equilibrium” cattle prices 
determined by aggregate demand and supply (i.e. there are no losers and winners as was 
the case for the auction model).   
  Characterization of packer’s strategic behavior within the NEIO model is 
achieved via “conjectural variations” representing firm’s best guess about competitors’ 
response to a change in purchases of cattle.  These conjectural variations are derived from 
the first-order condition of packer’s profit maximization.  Subsequent aggregation of firm 
behavior yields an industry supply equation incorporating industry-level conjectural 
variations. 
  To illustrate the concepts of the NEIO model, consider the same beef processing 
industry described previously, and assume that farm input producers compete perfectly 
and supply farm inputs to packers via an inverse supply function represented as: 
 
  = ) | ( /
1 ζ
   
 
  
           = ∑ = , 
where  
   is the average price of cattle in the industry,   is the number lots sold, 
  
      is the 
winning bid for the  th lot of cattle,  
   is the total supply of cattle, and ζ is a vector of 
supply shifters.
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 is the quantity of cattle 
purchased by packer  . 
                                                 
1 Notice that market level (equilibrium) price of cattle  
  in (2.5) is not equal to the transaction-level price 
of cattle 
 
     in (2.4).  The former is the average of winning bids in   cattle auctions (transactions), while 
the latter includes losing bids.  Thus  
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1 ∑ = , where 
  
     is the winning bid. 
(2.5)   12 
  As was with the auction model, packers’ processing technology is assumed to be 
of Generalized Leontief form.  For simplification, the conversion factor to convert cattle 
into boxed beef is assumed to be one.  Thus,   
  =   
  =  .   
The profit maximization problem for packer   is represented as: 
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where πi is packer  ’  profit,  
  is the retail price of beef, and  ) (
 
       is the processing cost 
function for a representative packer.  The first order condition for maximizing equation 
(2.6) is: 
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          =  processor  ’s market 
share, and  ∑ ≠ =
 




           / θ is packer  ’s conjecture about rivals’ responses to its 
change in purchases of cattle.   
  Customary with the NEIO model, an industry pricing equation is obtained from 
equation (2.7) after multiplying every term of (2.7) by each firm’s market share   , and 
summing across all processors in the industry as: 
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Re-arranging (2.8) equation yields the industry pricing equation:  
(2.7) 
(2.6) 
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      θ  is the industry weighted conjectural variation in the 
farm-input market,  ) (
       is industry level processing cost, and ∑ =
         
2  is the 
Herfindahl index in the processing sector.   
Equation (2.9) shows the NEIO measure of industry oligopsony power is directly 
related to both industry concentration (   ), and weighted firm-conjectures about how 
competitors respond to a change in purchases of cattle (Θ).  The industry conjectural 
variation Θ is equal to zero under the Cournot-type competition, minus one under perfect 
competition, and one under perfect collusion.  
The difference between oligopsony power from the NEIO model and oligopsony 
power from the structural auction model can be emphasized by separating the price 
markdown in equilibrium equations (2.4) and (2.9) respectively, as: 
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) (
−





    




           
   







     
 
     
         
ε
Θ +
= − −  
As shown in equations (2.4a) and (2.9a), while the markdown derived with the auction 




             , depend on the number of bidders on a particular lot of 
cattle (  ), the markdown derived with the NEIO theory depends on the number of 
packers in the industry ( ), since  , ) / 1 ( ) / (




      = = =∑  and the type of 
packer’s conjectures about rivals response to change in purchases of cattle 
(2.9) 
(2.4a) 
(2.9a)   14 
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           θ   Clearly, these two models seek to measure different market power 
effects. 
      a                     a     a                                        
The previous two sections outlined the structural auction and the NEIO models regarding 
potential oligopsony power in cattle procurement markets.  The auction theory estimates 
transaction level oligopsony markdowns, and the NEIO approach estimates market level 
oligopsony markdowns.   
  This section proposes an encompassing model that incorporates markdowns from 
both bid shading and industry-level imperfect competition.  As mentioned previously, bid 
shading in auctions and market-level imperfect competition are different concepts, but 
could be nested within the same model.   
  The encompassing model proposed here is an extension of the NEIO model to 
incorporate both market powers from bid shading and from industry level imperfect 
competition.  To illustrate the intuition behind our model, consider a cattle market where 
packers procure cattle through first-price sealed-bid auctions.  As noted previously, the 
number of bidders for a particular lot of cattle does not necessarily equal the number of 
firms in the industry.  Furthermore, assume that packers bidding for the  th cattle lot may 
act strategically and bid below their valuation by the amount    , given by the right hand-
side of equation (2.4a).  Thus, the price 
 
     paid by a winning bidder is equal to bidder’s 
valuation     minus the shading factor    .  Recall that the valuation     is defined as the 
difference between wholesale price of beef minus the processing cost (    =    
 
      − ). 
If bid shading is zero (i.e.     = 0), then price markdown from the NEIO model is 
the “true” markdown that the NEIO model seeks to explain.  This markdown is   15 
represented by the right hand side of equation (2.9a).  Denote this markdown by  .  
However, if bid shading is not zero, then the markdown estimated with the NEIO 
approach contains the “true” markdown ( ) that the NEIO model seeks to explain plus 
some bid shading    (   = Σ   / ).  Denote this markdown by .
~
    Mathematically, the 
relationship between  
~
 and   is: 
,
~
      δ + =  
where  
~
 is the “mixed” markdown containing the “true“ markdown ( ) that the NEIO 
seeks to explain plus the average bid shading on   total cattle lots    (   = Σ   / ). 
Therefore, in the presence of bid shading, the industry-pricing rule represented by 
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relationship between the industry conjectural variation (Θ) in   (when there is no bid 




(when there is bid shading) can 
be expressed as: 
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which can be re-arranged to yield: 
⋅ + Θ = Θ












(2.12a)   16 
Equation (2.12a) shows that when both bid shading and industry level imperfect 
competition are considered, the conjectural variation obtained with the NEIO model is a 
“mixed” conjectural variation  )
~
(Θ given by the sum of the “true” conjectural variation 
(Θ) and the average bid shading   , weighted by the ratio of elasticity of cattle supply to 
the price of cattle times the Herfindahl index  )). /( (      
   
  ε  
The encompassing model considering both bid shading and industry level 
imperfect competition is obtained by substituting equations (2.12a) and (2.12) back into 




     
   
           
 
 
   
 





= − −  
The model represented by equation (2.13), is more general than the models represented 
by equations (2.4a) and (2.9a) since it nests both (2.4a) and (2.9a).  Industry-level 
imperfect competition, which the NEIO model seeks to explain, is captured by Θ, the 
industry conjectural variation.  The price markdown considered by the auction model is 
represented by the bid shading factor   .   
Notice that if    = 0, there is no bid shading, and all perceived price markdown is 
due to industry level imperfect competition.  In this case, equation (2.13) becomes 
equation (2.9a).  If Θ = 0 and    ≠ 0, equation (2.13) becomes equation (2.4a), and all 
perceived price markdown is due to bid shading.  If Θ ≠ 0 and    ≠ 0, then perceived price 
markdown are due to both bid shading and industry level imperfect competition.   
Data and Empirical Application 
This section uses data from a cattle procurement experiment to test the encompassing 
model proposed in the previous section.  The cattle experiment is described first, 
(2.13)   17 
followed by an empirical procedure to test the theory.  The data only allow for an indirect 
test rather than a direct test using equation (2.13).  We also estimate markups using the 
both traditional NEIO model and a structural auction model, and compare these markups 
with the markups estimated directly from the data. 
 a a 
The data used in this study were generated from a five-hour evening workshop using the 
     a      a          a    (FCMS) (Hogan et al., 2003; Ward, 2005) in February, 
2006.  The FCMS simulates a market for fed cattle that mimics the real-world cattle 
procurement market.  Some of the participants in the FCMS play the role of feedlot 
managers while others the role of meatpackers  
The participants in our experiments were primarily undergraduate students 
majoring in agricultural economics.  The students were organized in four packer teams 
(each with four members) and eight feedlot manager teams (each with 3 or 4 members).  
In addition, one “observer” was allocated to each feedlot with the exclusive task of 
recording all bids, both winning and losing bids, submitted by packers.  The observers 
recorded bids on special paper cards, and did not participate in cattle trades.  The data 
recorded at each feedlot consisted of price and quality of cattle sold, and identity of 
feedlots and buyers. 
  During the experimental game, packer and feedlot teams are instructed to 
maximize profits.  Both packers and feedlot managers were instructed to buy and sell 
cattle for profit.  Competition among teams was stimulated by paying a $40 participation 
fee per person with the opportunity to win more or lose part of the fee based on financial 
performance during the game.   18 
Each member of a packer team was assigned to a feedlot and instructed to act as a 
regional buyer, just like in real cattle procurement markets.  This was intended to allow 
enough time for packers to inspect and submit bids for cattle among spatially dispersed 
feedlots.  Each trading period lasted about ten minutes and was called a “week.”  The 
winner of each auction was the packer who submitted the highest bid.  
During the trading period, paper cards representing completed trades are returned 
to the instructors who scanned them into a computer.  The information on each card from 
a completed trade includes the price and quality of cattle sold, and identity of the seller 
and the buyer.  This information is summarized for market participants before the next 
trading period.  Thus, feedlots and meatpacking managers are informed about the volume 
of cattle trade, cattle placed on feed, and the wholesale price of processed beef in the 
previous trading period.   
A total of 1,788 transaction data were collected during fourteen trading weeks, 
after allowing for a training period of two weeks.  After the first seven weeks of cattle 
trades, two mergers were simulated.  Packer one merged with Packer two, and Packer 
three merged with Packer four.  These mergers represented the smallest packers (1 and 2) 
and the largest packers (3 and 4).  Overall, the structure of the game remained essentially 
the same after the mergers except that there were two bigger packers instead of four 
smaller ones.  Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are reported in 
table 1. 
As reported in table 1, the average cattle price after adjusting for dressing 
percentage (121$/cwt) is greater than the price of beef (119$/cwt).  Further, the spread 
between boxed beef price and the dressed cattle price is negative in 536 out of 1066   19 
transactions, suggesting that packers lost money in about half of the transactions.  This 
suggests that market power, if any, is expected to be small. 
                              a            
 
This section tests outlines the procedures to test our encompassing model.  The test is 
based on a single-equation regression of price spread on number of bidders and market-
level concentration.  The test whether the hypothesis that an aggregate model (i.e. the 
NEIO model) is consistent with the data against the hypothesis that the disaggregate 
model (i.e. the structural auction model) is consistent with the data.  This is a rather 
indirect test.  A direct test of our theory using equation (2.13) would require estimating a 
bid-shading factor using the auction model, and use this estimate as an explanatory 
variable in our NEIO like regression in the second step.  Notice that estimation of bid 
shading using equation (2.4a) requires data with at least two bidders in every transaction.  
However, our experimental data contained numerous transactions with only one bidder, 
precluding a meaningful estimation of markups using the structural auction model.  This 
is limitation of the structural auction model. 
The test of an aggregate model against a disaggregate model is nonnested 
because, in principle, neither of the two models can be obtained from the other by 
imposing restrictions on parameters of either model.  The encompassing test considered 
here consists of artificially nesting the two candidate models within a single model, and 
then carry out hypotheses tests.   
The candidate models are single-equation regressions of a packer margin (i.e. 
price spread between wholesale beef price and bid price) on a set of explanatory 
variables.  The encompassing model ( 3) nests models ( 1) and model ( 2).  Model   20 
 1 represents a disaggregate model such as an auction model, and model  2 represents 
an aggregate model such as the traditional NEIO model.  To account for weekly changes 
in demand and supply of cattle that are observed imperfectly within the experimental 
cattle market, an additional error term is appended to the nested model ( 3) to capture 
these time random effects, as: 
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where subscript   represents a lot of cattle, subscript   indicates a week within which the 
 th lot is sold 
 
     is beef price, 
  
    is winning bid,        is total demand for cattle,     1, 
    2,     3,     4,     5,     6, and     7 are zero-one indicator variables that equal one if 
the cattle are bought from feedlots 1, …, 7, respectively;        is the inventory of cattle 
available for sale in a given week,   150 , and   175 are zero-one indicator variables that 
equal one if steer’s weight is 1500, and 1175 lbs., respectively;     , and      are 
zero-one indicator variables that equal one if the generic type of carcass quality is 
medium, and high, respectively;    1,    2 and    3 are zero one indicator variables that 
equal to one if there were one, two, or three bidders on the lot;     is industry 
concentration, the  s '    ω  are parameters to be estimated,  ) , 0 ( ~
2
        η σ η  is a week 
specific random error term to capture imperfectly measured changes in weekly demand 
and supply of cattle,  ) , 0 ( ~
2    
      ε σ ε , is a observation- specific error term that accounts 
for possible heteroskedasticity inherent to time-series cross-sectional data, with 
) exp( 2 1 0
2
                        
   + + = ε σ  and  . 0 ) , cov( =      η ε   Notice that models  1 and   21 
 2 are similar to  3 except that  1 does not include      , and  2 does not include 
   1,    2, and    3.  Variance components model ( 3) was estimated via maximum 
likelihood (ML) using the NLMIXED Procedure in SAS 9.1 (SAS 2001-2003). 
There are two null hypotheses of interest in model  3.  The first null hypothesis 
is that the coefficients for    1,    2 and    3 are jointly zero  ). 0 : ( 16 15 14 01 = = = ω ω ω     
The second null hypothesis is that the coefficient for     is zero  ) 0 : ( 17 02 = ω   .  If both 
 01 and  02 are rejected, then number of bidders and the number of firms contain unique 
information, and suggest an encompassing model ( 3) rather than either model  1 or 
 2.  If both  01 and  02 are not rejected, then the number of bidders and the number of 
firms contain the same information and either aggregate or disaggregate model could be 
used.  If only  01 is rejected then a disaggregate model is favored, while if only  02 is 
rejected an aggregate model is favored.   
     a        a         a                
 
This section reports the procedures used to estimate packer’s bid shading using the 
structural auction model represented by equation (2.4a).  The estimate of the auction 
model is compared with an estimate of price markdowns computed directly from the data.  
The estimation considers the number of potential bidders rather than the actual number of 
bidders.  This was due to the presence of numerous transactions where only one bidder 
submitted a bid, which precluded estimation of bid shading using equation (2.4a). 
  The estimation of packer’s bid shading in equation (2.4a) uses the nonparametric 
approach for estimating the structural auction model proposed by Guerre et al. (2000).  
As equation (2.4a) shows, packer’s bid shading is the ratio of the bid probability 
distribution  ) (
 
        to the product between bidders’ density function  ) (
 
       and the   22 
number of bidders on a given lot of cattle (  ).  Following Guerre et al. (2000), the 
estimates of bid cumulative distribution and density functions are obtained via the 
empirical distribution  ) ( ˆ  
       and kernel density estimator ) ( ˆ  









   
  
 
        
  





















    
   
 
   
     
where   is a  a        defining the size of the “neighborhood” around and arbitrary bid 
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      is the  th bid in the interval ( 
   -  ,  
  
 +  ),   is the total number of cattle lots, and 
 (•) is the kernel density function, which assigns weights to every bid in the 
neighborhood of  
  .   
  The kernel density function defined by equation (2.15), is estimated assuming a 
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Previous studies indicate that while the choice of the form of the kernel functional form 
does not affect results in practice, the choice of the bandwidth ( ) may affect results 
(DiNardo and Tobias, 2001; Härdle et al., 2004).  Sheather (2004, p.596) recommends 
the Sheather-Jones plug-in method (SJPI) due to good performance.  The SJPI is defined 
as: 
, ) 3 / 4 ( ˆ
5 / 1     σ =  
whereσ ˆ  is sample standard deviation of the bids and   is the number of bids in the 




(2.17)   23 
The option METHOD = SJPI in the KDE Procedure is used to request bandwidths 
computed using the SJPI.   
  Next, the estimates of bid shading for each successful transaction are computed 
using equation (2.4a), as: 
⋅
−
= = − −
) 1 )( ( ˆ
) ( ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
     
   







     
 
  δ  
where
  
     is a winning bid on the  th lot of cattle won by packer  .  
 
 
     a        a   a      a             
 
This section reports the procedures used to estimate markups using a traditional NEIO 
model represented by equation (2.9a).  The estimate of the auction model is compared 
with an estimate of price markdowns computed directly from the data.   
Before equation (2.9a) can be estimated, however, it is necessary to define 
packers’ processing cost equation.  Following Azzam (2001), packer’s processing cost 
function  ) (
 
       is represented by the Generalized Leontief, as: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + + =
   












                      , ) ( ) ( ) , (
2 2 / 1 β λ α v  
where 
 
    is packer  ’s output, v is a price vector of non-farm inputs such as labor and 
capital,   is a time trend, and    α ,   λ , and    are parameters to be estimated.  Notice that, 
with the exception of cattle, all non-farm inputs needed for beef processing remain 
constant in the experimental market.  Therefore, packer’s processing cost represented by 
(2.18) 
(2.4b)   24 
(2.16) reduces to , ) ( ) (
2  
   
 
   
 
    
 
              β λ α + + = which is simply a quadratic cost 
function. 
  The industry marginal cost ), (
       required to estimate industry-level markups 
represented by equation (2.13), is obtained in the following way.  First, we differentiate 
packer’s processing cost equation (2.16) with respect to output to get a firm-level 
marginal cost, as  . 2 / ) ( ) ( 1 0
 






              β β + = ∂ ∂ =   For convenience, industry 
marginal cost can simply be represented as: 




        =  
Next, we obtain the industry marginal cost equation by multiplying every term of (2.19) 









              , 2 ) (  
which can be re-arranged to yield the industry marginal cost function ), ( ,
      as: 
. 2 ) (          
    =  
  Lastly, the industry pricing equation used to estimate oligopsony power is 
obtained by re-arranging equation (2.9a), after replacing ) (
      with equation (2.20), as: 
, 2 ]
) 1 (
1 [      
   









where δ ˆ is a transaction level average bid shading estimated with the structural auction 
approach described previously.   
  Empirical estimation of equation (2.9b) also requires knowing the elasticity of 
cattle supply.  The elasticity of cattle supply could be obtained from a cattle supply 




(2.19)   25 
equations containing equation (2.9b) and a supply equation was not well identified since 
there was no variable in the demand equation that was not in the supply equation.  
Following Paul’s (2001) suggestion, equation (2.9b) was estimated alone assuming 
several values for cattle supply elasticity (0.2, 0.4, 0.8 and 1).  Specifically the following 
equation was estimated: 
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    is the average price of boxed beef in week  , 
 
    is the average cattle dressed 
price,       is the total inventory of cattle in the show list a0, a1, a2 and Θ  are 
parameter to be estimated, and   , is a error term.   
To account for possible measurement error and endogeneity that leads to 
inconsistent OLS because  , 0 ] [ ≠          e quation (2.21) is estimated by nonlinear two-
stage least squares (N2SLS) using the MODEL Procedure, SAS 9.1 (SAS Institute, 2002-
03).  The N2SLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient when endogenous 
variables are correlated with error terms (Zellner and Theil, 1962).  
Results 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the encompassing model represented by equation 
(2.13) are shown in table 2.  The estimates of interest are the coefficients of the 
Herfindahl index  ), 95 . 11 ˆ ( 17 = ω and the coefficient for indicator variables for one bidder 
), 47 . 0 ˆ ( 14 = ω  two bidders  ), 38 . 0 ˆ ( 15 = ω  and three bidders  ). 38 . 0 ˆ ( 16 = ω   These 
coefficients are significant at the 10% level, except the coefficient for the indicator 
variable when for one bidder.  Theory predicts that the price spread between beef price 
and cattle price should decrease as the number of firms or/and the number of bidders 
(2.21)   26 
decreases.  Therefore, the coefficient for     and the coefficients for number of bidders 
have the correct positive signs.  The coefficient for number of bidders is correct because 
the reference is the indicator variable for four bidders.  Thus, as expected, results show 
that the price spread between price of price of beef and cattle increases as the number of 
bidders decrease. 
  However, while the coefficient for     and the coefficients for number of bidders 
have the correct sign, the coefficient for     is least twenty times bigger than the 
coefficients of indicator variables for number of bidders.  This suggests that the number 
of firms is more important in explaining price markups than the number of bidders for a 
particular lot of cattle.  Thus, an aggregate model (such as NEIO) seem relatively more 
consistent with the experimental data than a disaggregate model (such as structural 
auction model). 
  The null hypothesis that an aggregate model ( 2) is the correct model (H01:    1 
=    1 =    1 = 0) is rejected at the 5 % level based on a likelihood ratio (LR) test, since 
LR = -2[log-likelihood  1- log-likelihood  3] = 10.2
2
05 . 0 , 3 χ > =5.99.  The null hypothesis 
that a disaggregate model ( 1) is the correct model  ) 0 : ( 02 ≤       is also rejected at the 
at the 5% level based on a one tailed  -test (  = 1.98>1.75 =  16, 0.05).  Thus, although size 
of the coefficients showed that the number of firms in the experimental game is more 
important than the number of bidders for a particular lot of cattle, the number of bidders 
does contain some (unique) information about pricing behavior in the game.  Results 
suggest that both the number of firms and bidders should be considered in the estimation.  
Thus, there is some gain from considering both traditional NEIO and auction measures of 
market power within the same model.    27 
Estimates of price markdown estimated with the structural auction model and 
traditional NEIO model are shown in tables 3 and 4 respectively.  The structural auction’s 
average markdown for all bidders shown in table 3 is $3.36 per cwt, and the average 
markdown obtained with the traditional NEIO approach is $2.7 per cwt.  Both the NEIO 
and the structural auction approach seem to overestimate the true markdown because the 
average markdown estimated directly from data is nearly zero.  Packers profit, given by 
the difference between average price spread ($1.22 cwt) minus the average marginal cost 
(roughly estimated at $5 cwt), is negative (-$4.78 cwt).  Thus, it is unlikely that packers 
in the game could have positive markdowns as suggested by the traditional NEIO and the 
structural auction approach.   
Estimates of price markdowns using the NEIO and structural auction approach are 
not consistent regression results from the encompassing equation (2.13).  The regression 
results suggest much more difference between price markdowns the estimated with NEIO 
and structural auction approach that it is actually found.  One possible explanation for 
this discrepancy in results is failure of the two approaches to account for the winner’s 
curse.  The price spreads estimated directly from data reveal that packers lost money in 
about half of the transactions.  Other possible source of bias for the structural auction 
approach is use on potential number of dibbers than the actual number of bidders, and 
failure to account for refusal to sale.  
Conclusion 
 
Recently, there have been many studies evaluating potential market power in the U.S. 
cattle procurement markets.  These studies used either the NEIO model or the auction 
model.  However, price markdown measures from these two approaches are not the same.   28 
While the NEIO model seeks to measure price distortions due to industry-level imperfect 
competition, the auction models consider price distortion from bid shading at local 
auctions.  A formal model considering both types of price markdowns has not been 
developed.   
The encompassing model proposed in this study that considers both price 
markdowns from bid shading and price markdowns due to industry-level imperfect 
competition.  An indirect test of our model showed that the number of firms in the 
experimental game is more important than the number of bidders on a lot of cattle in 
explaining price markdowns in the experimental game.  However, results also show that 
the number of bidders on a particular lot of cattle contains some unique information and 
should not be neglected.  Thus, while an aggregate model seems more appropriate than a 
disaggregate model, an encompassing model similar to the one proposed in this study, 
seems even better.  Both the NEIO and structural auction failed to account for the 
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Table 1.  Mean and Standard Deviation of the Variables from the Experimental Market  
 
 
Variable  Mean  S D 
 
Before Merger (n=302) 
 





       ($/cwt)  128.8  0.5 
      ($/cwt)  125.3  2.5 
       (pens)  113.4  4.2 
      (pens)  38.3  4.4 
     0.3  0.009 
 
After Merger (n=290) 
 





       ($/cwt)  118.7  1.9 
      ($/cwt)  121.7  2.8 
       (pens)  131.2  8.8 
      (pens)  41.7  3.5 
     0.5  0.01   34 
Table 2.  Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors of the 
                Nonnested Model  
 
Parameter  Estimate  Standard 
error  t-value  Pr > |t| 
intercept  -10.80  8.25  -1.31  0.2086 
cattle inventory (      )  -0.01  0.07  -0.08  0.9343 
total demand (     )  0.13  0.12  1.04  0.3129 
cattle from Feedlot 1 (    1)  0.17  0.19  0.87  0.3979 
cattle from Feedlot 2 (    2)  -0.06  0.20  -0.32  0.7522 
cattle from Feedlot 3 (    3)  -0.59  0.19  -3.05  0.0076 
cattle from Feedlot 4 (    4)  0.24  0.19  1.22  0.2401 
cattle from Feedlot 5 (    5)  -0.83  0.20  -4.22  0.0006 
cattle from Feedlot 6 (    6)  -0.41  0.20  -2.05  0.0575 
cattle from Feedlot 7 (    7)  0.44  0.21  2.1  0.0515 
medium generic carcass (    )  1.25  0.12  10.82  < 0.0001 
high generic carcass (    )  3.03  0.13  22.7  < 0.0001 
cattle sold at 1500 lbs. (  150)  1.07  0.19  5.74  < 0.0001 
cattle sold at 1500 lbs. (  175)  3.92  0.31  12.62  < 0.0001 
Herfindahl index (   )  11.95  6.04  1.98  0.0654 
indicator for bidder 1 (      1)  0.47  0.44  1.06  0.3053 
indicator for bidder 2 (      2)  0.38  0.22  1.78  0.0947 
indicator for bidder 3 (      3)  0.28  0.15  1.86  0.0811 
intercept of the variance equation  0.44  0.87  0.51  0.619 
slope of inventory in the variance 
equation  -0.02  0.01  -2.55  0.0215 
slope of total demand in the variance 
equation  0.05  0.01  3.32  0.0043 
variance of time random effect  4.38  1.52  2.88  0.011 
-2 log-likelihood  1916.6 
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before merger (optimal bandwidth = 0.36) 
packer 1  1.06  1.15   
packer 2  1.33  0.78   
packer 3  2.77  0.81   
packer 4  2.41  1.12   
all four packers  2.00  0.91  0.264 
after merger (optimal bandwidth = 0.69) 
Packers 1&2  5.78  1.10   
Packers 3&4  3.89  2.26   
all two packers  4.71  1.54  0.512 
Industry (before & after mergers)        
Note:  Optimal bandwidths of 0.28 before merger and 0.81 after were selected using 
           Sheather-Jones plug in method.   36 
Table 4. Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the NEIO Model  
 
Parameter  Symbol  Estimate  Standard error  p-value 
Industry conjectural variation  Θ  -0.94  0.19  0.0004 
Processor’s pricing equation 
intercept 
a   -4.76  2.31  0.0633 
Coefficient for packer’s marginal 
cost 
a   13.06  34.04  0.7085 
Price markdown    2.7     
 
 